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Vulnerability | Threat-source | Threat Action | Category of Harm | Likelihood of Occurrence | Impact of Harm |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
System unavailability | Error, component failure, or act of God | Power failure, network failure, computer component failure, operator error, software failure, capacity constraint, etc. | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Moderate: failures will happen, but competently managed systems typically have availability records of 99% or better | Low: for fishery management decision support typical availability is adequate. Even in the event of a systemic failure fishery management decision-making would continue and unavailability would be a short-term inconvenience. Smaller scale failures, for instance a failure that prevents reporting from one vessel, would be a minor inconvenience. |
System unavailability | Vandalism | Internet security exploit such as denial-of-service attack | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: this is not an online Internet-exposed system and should have very low vulnerability to network-based exploits. | Low: even in the event of a systemic failure fishery management decision-making would continue and unavailability would be a short-term inconvenience |
System misuse | System administrator, operator, or other agency user | Abuse of insider knowledge and access for unauthorized use or release of information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: agency staff have significant incentives to behave appropriately and periodic training in ethics and computer security | Moderate: at worst, a release of personal or commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in loss of confidentiality with an expected serious adverse effect on organizational operations. |
Failure to report | Fisher | Fisher fails to report, either through negligence, or with intent to mislead fisheries managers and evade fisheries management controls | Harm to agency programs or public interests | Low: permitted fishers know the rules and understand the risks of non-compliance | Moderate: any individual trip report would be inconsequential in overall impact, but widespread and long-term failure to report may facilitate overfishing. |
Under-reporting or misreporting catch | Fisher | Fisher under-reports or misreports, to mislead fisheries managers and evade fisheries management controls | Harm to agency programs or public interests | Low: permitted fishers know the rules and understand the risks of non-compliance | Low: any individual trip report with highly unlikely numbers would trigger data quality checks and would be corrected or disregarded. Credible individual trip reports, even if intentionally misreported, would be inconsequential in overall impact. Even a concerted long-term effort to misreport by any one fisher is likely to be either not creditable or inconsequential. |
Impersonation in e-logbook transactions | Common criminal/identity thief | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, with fraudulent reporting of false data to incriminate or defame victim | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: common criminals are unlikely to have subject-area expertise to discover an incrimination or defamation opportunity and there are probably easier attacks | Low: impersonated parties or agency staff would be likely to notice during dockside interview process and/or subsequent data review, and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
" | " | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, for access to sensitive information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: successful identity theft could result in compromise of sensitive information from the victim's logbook records but an uninformed criminal would be unlikely to find or identify sensitive information | Low: probably the only information of value that is credibly at risk is catch location, timing, and gear, and the people with the means to take advantage of that unique information are already well placed to have that same knowledge or to acquire it by closely observing the victim's fishing activity. Also, the impact would be limited to the party whose identity has been stolen |
Impersonation in e-logbook transactions | Disgruntled industry employee | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, with fraudulent reporting of false data to incriminate or defame victim | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Moderate: an employee might have the means, motive, and opportunity, but risk exposure is not significantly different in electronic transactions than it is in paper transactions | Low: impersonated parties or agency staff would be likely to notice during dockside interview process and/or subsequent data review, and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
" | " | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, for access to sensitive information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: the employee with the means and opportunity already has access to sensitive information and is unlikely to find anything more interesting in logbook data | Low: probably the only information of value that is credibly at risk is catch location, timing, and gear, and the disgruntled employee is likely to already have that information from personal observation. Also, the impact would be limited to the party whose identity has been stolen |
Impersonation in e-logbook transactions | Competitor | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, with fraudulent reporting of false data to incriminate or defame victim | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: a competitor might have a motive, but an electronic system does not make them more likely to have means or opportunity. Risk exposure is not significantly different in electronic transactions than it is in paper transactions. | Low: impersonated parties or agency staff would be likely to notice during dockside interview process and subsequent data review, and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
" | " | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, for access to sensitive information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: a competitor might have a motive, but an electronic system does not make them more likely to have means or opportunity. Risk exposure is not significantly different in electronic transactions than it is in paper transactions. | Low: probably the only information of value that is credibly at risk is catch location, timing, and gear, and the people with the means to take advantage of that unique information are already well placed to have that same knowledge or to acquire it by closely observing the victim's fishing activity. Also, the impact would be limited to the party whose identity has been stolen |
Repudiation to escape accountability | Customer (fisher) | Signer claims "I didn't sign that" | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: in most cases a customer who repudiated an e-logbook document submission could then be prosecuted for fishing without following record-keeping and reporting requirements. There will generally be independent evidence of the fishing or processing activity (follow the fish.) | Low: agency might expend effort to resolve, but the distress would be limited and short-term |
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