...
Perhaps the most significant mitigating control is that in commercial fisheries transactions, both parties to the transaction transactions (typically the fisher and the fish processor) are permitted entities and each has some responsibility for accurate and complete record-keeping and reporting (for example, the fisher may be required to keep a logbook showing fishing efforts and catch, while the processor is required to report fish purchased). In these transactions it is typical for the parties to the transactions to have opposite and balancing interests (for example, when a fisher is selling fish to a processor, the fisher wants the amount paid to be high, while the processor wants the amount paid to be low). These multiple sources of information and counter-balanced incentives tend to make deception more difficult to initiate and sustain.
...
In the Hawaii longline logbook case we have independent confirmation of the vessel's location through the VMS system. . This allows agency confirmation of fishing locations reported on logbook entries.
The e-logbook software application licensing compliance dongle forms a unique identifier for each logbook page and it can tie the a logbook page submission to a particular instance of the e-logbook software.
These The vessels which will be reporting are permitted to fish and therefore have a prior "trusted relationship" with NMFS. In many cases this prior relationship involves confirming vessel ownership with the US Coast Guard, verifying participation in prior fisheries through previously submitted state or federal fish tickets or logbooks, confirmation of business ownership, etc.
...
Vulnerability | Threat-source | Threat Action | Category of Harm | Likelihood of Occurrence | Impact of Harm |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
System unavailability | Error, vandalism, or act of God | Power failure, network failure, computer component failure, operator error, software failure, capacity constraint, vandalism, etc. | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Moderate: failures will happen, but competently managed systems typically have availability records of 98% or better | Low: for fishery management decision support typical availability is adequate. Even in the event of a systemic failure fishery management decision-making would continue and unavailability would be a short-term inconvenience. Smaller scale failures, for instance a failure that prevents reporting from one vessel, would be a minor inconvenience. |
System unavailability | Vandalism | Internet security exploit such as denial-of-service attack | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: this is not an online Internet-exposed system and should have very low vulnerability to network-based exploits. | Low: even in the event of a systemic failure fishery management decision-making would continue and unavailability would be a short-term inconvenience |
System intrusion bypassing access controls | System administrator, operator, or other agency user | Abuse of insider knowledge to achieve unauthorized objectives |
|
| |
Impersonation in e-logbook transactions | Common criminal/identity thief | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, with fraudulent reporting of false data to incriminate or defame victim | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: common criminals are unlikely to have subject-area expertise to discover an incrimination or defamation opportunity and there are probably easier attacks | Low: impersonated parties or agency staff would be likely to notice during dockside interview process and/or subsequent data review, and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
" | " | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, for access to sensitive information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: successful identity theft and successful access to the vessel's computer could result in compromise of sensitive information from the victim's electronic logbook records but that requires compromising two security controls; also an uninformed criminal would be unlikely to find or identify sensitive information | Low: probably the only information of value that is credibly at risk is catch location, timing, and gear, and the people with the means to take advantage of that unique information are already well placed to have that same knowledge or to acquire it by closely observing the victim's fishing activity. Also, the impact would be limited to the party whose identity has been stolen |
Impersonation in e-logbook transactions | Disgruntled industry employee | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, with fraudulent reporting of false data to incriminate or defame victim | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Moderate: an employee might have the means, motive, and opportunity, but risk exposure is not significantly different in electronic transactions than it is in paper transactions | Low: impersonated parties or agency staff would be likely to notice during dockside interview process and/or subsequent data review and reconciliation, and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
" | " | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, for access to sensitive information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: the employee with the means and opportunity already has access to sensitive information and is unlikely to find anything more interesting in e-logbook data | Low: probably the only information of value that is credibly at risk is catch location, timing, and gear, and the people with the means to take advantage of that unique information are already disgruntled industry employee is well placed to already have that same knowledge or to acquire it by closely observing the victim's fishing activity. Also, the impact would be limited to the party whose identity has been stolen |
Impersonation in e-logbook transactions | Competitor | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, with fraudulent reporting of false data to incriminate or defame victim | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: a competitor might have a motive, but an electronic system makes them less likely to have means or opportunity. Risk exposure is reduced significantly in electronic transactions versus paper transactions. | Low: impersonated parties or agency staff would be likely to notice during dockside interview process and subsequent data review and reconcilation, and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
" | " | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, for access to sensitive information | Unauthorized release of sensitive information | Low: a competitor might have a motive, but an electronic system does not make them more likely to have means or opportunity. Risk exposure is not significantly different in electronic transactions than it is in paper transactions. | Low: probably the only information of value that is credibly at risk is catch location, timing, and gear, and the people with the means to take advantage of that unique information are already well placed to have that same knowledge or to acquire it by closely observing the victim's fishing activity. Also, the impact would be limited to the party whose identity has been stolen |
Repudiation to escape accountability | Customer (fisher) | Signer claims "I didn't sign that" | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: in most cases a customer who repudiated an e-logbook submission could then be prosecuted for fishing without reporting. There will generally be independent evidence of the fishing or processing activity (follow the fish, also follow the VMS track.) | Low: agency might expend effort to resolve, but the distress would be limited and short-term |
|
|
|
|
|
Categories of Harm and Impact Definitions for reference
...