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Vulnerability | Threat-source | Threat Action | Category of Harm | Likelihood of Occurrence | Impact of Harm | E-signature Cost Benefit Assessment |
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System unavailability | Error, component failure, or act of God | Power failure, network failure, computer component failure, operator error, software failure, capacity constraint, etc. | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Moderate: failures will happen, but competently managed systems typically have availability records of 99% or better | Low: for fishery management decision support typical availability is adequate. Even in the event of a systemic failure fishery management decision-making would continue and unavailability would be a short-term inconvenience. Smaller scale failures, for instance a failure that prevents reporting from one processor, would be a minor inconvenience. | N.A. (E-signature has no effect, positive or negative, on this vulnerability) N.A. (E-signature has no effect, positive or negative, on this vulnerability) |
System unavailability | Vandalism | Internet security exploit such as denial-of-service attack | Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation | Low: this is not an high-profile Internet system and should not be a particularly attractive target. Also, if necessary, the system could be hosted in a data center with an incident response capability that could deal with all but the most sophisticated attacks. | Low: even in the event of a systemic failure fishery management decision-making would continue and unavailability would be a short-term inconvenience | N.A. |
System misuse | System administrator, operator, or other agency user | Abuse of insider knowledge and access for unauthorized use or release of information | Civil or criminal violations | Low: agency staff have significant incentives to behave appropriately and periodic training in ethics and computer security | Moderate: at worst, a release of personal or commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in loss of confidentiality with an expected serious adverse effect on organizational operations. | N.A. |
Failure to report | Processor or processor in collusion with fisher | Processor fails to report, either through negligence, or with intent to mislead fisheries managers and evade fisheries management controls or enforcement actions | Civil or criminal violations | Low: permitted parties know the rules and understand the risks of non-compliance | Moderate: most individual trip reports would be inconsequential in overall impact, but some would be consequential, and any widespread or long-term failure to report would facilitate overfishing. |
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Under-reporting or misreporting catch | Fisher and processor in collusion | Fisher and processor collude to under-report or misreport, to mislead fisheries managers and evade fisheries management controls | Civil or criminal violations | Low: permitted parties have a lot to lose and there are enough checks and balances in the system to discourage fraud | Moderate: at worst, a serious adverse effect to public interests. For example, in a commercial landing the species could be misreported from an overfished species to a less restricted species to evade a fisheries closure action, with potentially significant damage to the overfished species public resource |
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Impersonation in e-ticket transactions | Common criminal/identity thief | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, to receive full market price for stolen fish | Civil or criminal violations | Low: e-ticket transactions take place in a context of fish delivery, and the fisher and processor are normally known to each other | Low: someone would be likely to notice and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated. The impact would be limited to the parties whose identity and fish have been stolen |
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Impersonation in e-ticket transactions | Competitor | Impersonation using stolen identity credentials, to sell fish without debiting own quota | Civil or criminal violations | Low: a competitor might have a motive, but an electronic system does not make them more likely to have means or opportunity. Risk exposure is not significantly different in electronic transactions than it is in paper transactions. | Low: impersonated parties would be likely to notice and when detected, the impact could be effectively mitigated |
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Repudiation to escape accountability | Customer (fisher or processor) | Signer claims "I didn't sign that" | Civil or criminal violations | Low: in most cases a customer who repudiated an e-ticket document submission could then be prosecuted for fishing or processing without meeting record-keeping and reporting obligations. There will generally be independent evidence of the fishing or processing activity (follow the fish.) | Low: agency might expend effort to resolve, but the distress would be limited and short-term |
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